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Across the globe, at least 115 million animals are experimented on each year. Because 
experiments take place behind closed doors, most people know little about what happens, and 
informed critical engagement is difficult. This well-referenced A4-sized volume performs the 
valuable service of throwing open the doors of a hidden world and exposing the multiple ethical 
compromises that perpetuate it. It is timely in a post-Brexit United Kingdom, with animal sentience 
soon likely to be recognized in domestic law. Research animals, which are overseen by the Home 
Office, are typically handled, transported, housed and used in ways that fall well below comparable 
requirements for farmed species, which are the responsibility of the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). Because most research animal species are undomesticated, 
confinement even without experimentation seriously impedes their ability to express normal 
behaviour. 
The volume’s first half comprises the 2015 multi-authored report of an interdisciplinary and 
international working group of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics titled ‘Normalizing the 
Unthinkable: The Ethics of Using Animals in Research’. This ends with a summary and conclusions 
although no recommendations. The report is followed by eleven supporting essays written from 
disciplinary perspectives including philosophy, history and classics. The report tackles head-on the 
institutionalization of animal experimentation over the past 150 years, which, its editors contend, is 
grounded in a pre-ethical view of animals that fails to recognize the moral implications of their 
sentience. At one and the same time, animals are regarded as sufficiently different from humans 
that experiments on them are morally justifiable, but as sufficiently like humans that the 
experimental findings are reliably translatable into the human context, where these will save and 
protect human lives. The funders of animal experiments include well-known medical charities, to 
whom many people are ethically motivated to donate, and research councils, which are funded by 
taxpayers. Animals are used in military research, such as to assess the effects of bomb blasts and 
nerve agents, and in food safety research, for example, to understand the impacts of bacterial 
contamination. In medical research they are used to gain insights into the effects of drugs and 
alcohol on the brain and body. Physically invasive stem cell research and research into genetic 
modification also uses animals. A wide range of household products and their chemical constituents 
are tested on animals. 
The report includes an informative critical discussion of the system regulating the use of 
animals in research (pp. 63–74). In the UK, this is overseen by the Animals in Science Committee 
(ASC, which in 2013 replaced the Animal Procedures Committee). Research facilities are subject to 
inspection, but the frequency of visits depends on resource. In the UK, figures published by the 
Home Office’s Animals in Science Regulation Unit (ASRU), which includes around 20 inspectors 
granting over 3000 personal and project licences annually, indeed show a steady fall in the number 
of inspections. Licensing requirements may not always be met, due to factors such as seriously 
inadequate overnight, weekend and holiday staffing, which may be minimal even if animals are 
recovering from recent procedures. It might be added that other recurring issues in ASRU’s annual 
reports include using far more animals than authorised and failures to administer appropriate pain 
relief. In the report the appropriateness of involving researchers and stakeholders in their own 
regulation is also queried. From an outsider perspective this is easy to criticize, but a workable 
system needs to draw on insider knowledge and competence as well as allowing robust external 
challenge. 
Given that ASRU’s annual budget is around £4 million a strong case could be made for 
remunerating ASC members. This would enable a wider range of qualified people to put themselves 
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forward to serve on the Committee than at present. Also the role and agenda of the National Centre 
for the Replacement, Refinement and Reduction of Animals in Research (NC3Rs), which was founded 
in 2004 and works with ASRU, needs further strengthening. The 3Rs could be more deeply and 
ambitiously embedded in scientific research by expanding funding streams to support the growth of 
alternative methods such as adult stem cell research, replicated organs-on-chips (OoCs) and 
laboratory-grown human organs. Other possible measures include journals that only publish 
research in which animals have not been used, and new 3Rs academic posts to build capacity. In a 
provocative contribution, Elizabeth Tyson argues (pp. 192–9) that provision for sanctuary or 
retirement should be made for former research animals, of a kind that provides for their needs 
rather than justifies the research. 
Using animals for research may be opposed on two broad grounds: first, that the findings 
are not reliably translatable into the human context, and second, that even if they are, such research 
is ethically unjustifiable. First the issue of translation. Animal reactions to products and physical 
treatment cannot be used to predict human responses. In the United States, the failure rate when 
findings from animal testing are applied to humans is well over 90% (pp. 27–8). Out of 90 HIV 
vaccines tested on animals, none has passed human testing (p. 30). Over 20 years, one hundred 
significant discoveries from animal research have led to only five commercial medical treatments (p. 
154). Only 1% of stroke drugs tested on animals has become a marketable product (p. 155). Benefits 
appear greater than they are due to the cumulative nature of experimentation, with a single benefit 
requiring many discrete experiments to realize and therefore being recited and recounted in the 
aims of multiple projects. Poor translation and minimal social impact are due to differences between 
animals in their natural wild habitat and in captivity, and to the differences between animal species 
and the human species. Captivity alters animal behaviour through environmental factors that induce 
distress and encourage stereotypies. Moreover, human disease morphology cannot be replicated in 
its full complexity in animals. Although non-human primates (NHPs) share most of their genes with 
humans—chimpanzees and humans have 98% in common—differences in DNA sequencing and 
genetic functioning greatly complicate interspecies extrapolation (pp. 178–80). If penicillin had been 
tested on guinea pigs rather than on rats, it would have killed them (p. 161) by disrupting their 
beneficial intestinal bacteria and so might not have made it to market. 
How about the basic question of whether animal research is ethically justifiable? Because 
proposals for research involving animals must pass ethical review, there is a tendency to regard all 
licensed research as ethical. However, much of what goes on could not be thus regarded according 
to a more rigorous definition of ethics. Animals are unable to grant or withhold consent and cannot 
express their interests. They are morally innocent and unable to defend themselves. Humans use 
animals in research only because they possess the brute power of fallen physical dominance over 
them. The report raises the interesting issue of the ethical implications of research animals’ inability 
to reflect on their suffering. Because animals, the report states, ‘live closer to their bodily senses 
than we do, the frustration of their natural freedoms may well induce more suffering than we allow. 
Human suffering, on the other hand, can be softened by an intellectual comprehension of the 
circumstances.’ (p. 40) Although the ability to rationalize suffering sometimes helps humans, it also 
means we have a more developed sense of self and of the possibility of its annihilation, whereas 
animals possess less reflective understanding of mortality or of the long-term effects of injury or 
trauma. The most salient difference between humans and other species seems to be our capacity for 
moral agency based on the capacity to deliberate. This should lead us to serious consideration and 
debate about the ethics of research using animals. 
Although the volume’s scientific and philosophical engagement is impressive, its grasp of 
intellectual history, including in theology, could be stronger. Aristotle is presented as a precursor to 
Galen and modern vivisection (pp. 34–7, 104–5) without reference to his extensive observation of 
animals in their natural habitats and cataloguing of their normal behaviours, which contributed to 
his ideas about animal purpose and flourishing. Although Rosalind Hursthouse’s reading of his theory 
of virtue as entailing compassion to animals is acknowledged in passing (p. 38), its implications are 
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not developed. A similarly negative portrayal is given of Immanuel Kant, and although Christine 
Korsgaard has argued that animals may be considered members of his moral universe (p. 36), her 
assessment is not allowed to shape the narrative. Thomas Aquinas is judged wanting because of his 
association with Aristotle and Roman Catholicism, without any recognition that he embraces 
Aristotle’s view of teleology as extending to all species and places the whole world under the 
dominion not of humans but of God. In fact, Aquinas recognizes that animals possess several 
attributes commonly associated with reasoning, including sensory discrimination, imagination, 
instinct, non-sensate apprehension and memory. Moreover, by subordinating human law to natural 
law he shows that just because an act is legal it is not ethical. These new perspectives on Aquinas 
have been developed over more than a decade by scholars such as John Berkman, David Clough, 
Celia Deane-Drummond and Mark Wynn. Because the volume ignores important work like this in 
favour of judgments based on guilt by association, in which a person is found wanting because of 
their association with another, its strictly theological significance is limited. Dated assessments are 
relied on that are derived from old work. Yet theology is peculiarly well-placed to call into question 
the hubristic justifying narrative of animal research, that (animal) sacrifice is necessary in order to 
achieve ongoing progress in medical and other scientific advances against feared disease and other 
threats to human life and well-being. 
